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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SCOTT ALLEN WRIGHT, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20010345-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
L BUT FOR TRIAL COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE AT 
THE SENTENCING HEARING, WRIGHT WOULD HAVE 
RECEIVED A MORE FAVORABLE SENTENCE 
The State declined to address the first Strickland prong, asserting instead that 
Wright was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance at the sentencing 
hearing (Br. of App. at 20). The State also claims that Wright's reliance on Wiggins v. 
Smith, 123 S.Ct 2527,156 L.Ed.2d 471(2003), and Armstrong v. Bugger, 833 F.2d 1430 
(1 lth Cir. 1987), are "substantially] distinguishable" because these are two capital 
punishment cases, whereas Wright was convicted only with one count of operating a 
clandestine laboratory (Br. of App. at 19, 21). 
However, Wright again asserts that the facts in the present case are eerily similar 
to Wiggins and Armstrong, the only material difference being that these two cases were in 
fact capital punishment cases. In Wiggins, the United States Supreme Court found the 
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trial counsel's performance was deficient for not presenting the following mitigating 
evidence at sentencing: Wiggins' mother frequently left Wiggins and his siblings home 
alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage; his 
mother beat her children for breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked; she 
had sex with men while her children slept in the same bed; she forced Wiggins' hand 
against a hot stove burner; Wiggins' was placed in foster care when he was six years old; 
Wiggins' first and second foster mothers physically abused him; his second foster father 
molested and raped him; Wiggins ran away from home and lived on the streets at age 
when sixteen years old; when he returned home one of his foster brother's allegedly gang 
raped him; after leaving the foster care system he entered a Job Corps program and was 
allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor, 123 S.Ct. at 2533. The Court concluded thai 
the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel for not presenting this mitigating evidence 
because he "has the kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a 
defendant's moral culpability" and "had the jury been confronted with this considerable 
mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a 
different sentence." Id. at 2542. 
The facts in Armstrong are also similar. Armstrong's trial counsel presented only 
one mitigating witness, his parol officer. 833 F.2d. at 1432. However, trial counsel failed 
to present the following mitigating evidence: Armstrong's history of nonviolence and 
religious activities; the fact that he was raised in poverty and poor living conditions; his 
hardworking nature and irregular school attendance due to the need to supplement his 
family's income; that he had epileptic seizures, and that one expert considered him 
2 
mentally retarded and had organic brain damage. Id. at 1433-34. The 11th Circuit Court 
concluded that the "demonstrated availability of undiscovered mitigating evidence clearly 
met the prejudice requirement." Id. at 1434. 
The United State Supreme Court observed in Wiggins that "In assessing prejudice, 
we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 
evidence/' because "evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant 
because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts 
that are attributable to a disadvantaged background ... may be less culpable than 
defendants who have no such excuse." 123 S.Ct. at 2542 (citation omitted). 
The sentencing judge must have "'the fullest information possible concerning the 
defendant's life and characteristics/ so that the punishment fits not only the crime, but 
the defendant as well.'" United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed, 1337 
(1949)). Moreover, due process "require[s] that a sentencing judge act on reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v. 
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). 
The following is a conservative list of the mitigating evidence that was or should 
have been presented to the trial court at the sentencing hearing: Wright had strong family 
support evidenced by the three rows of people that showed up at his sentencing hearing 
and the numerous number of letters in his behalf, making him a good candidate for 
reform and likely to respond favorably to treatment (R. 175: 16); Wright was a hard and 
honest worker (Defendant's Exhibit #3); Wright witnessed his mother's death when he 
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was five years old and believed he was the cause of her death - he was standing in the 
vehicle and believes he distracted his mother while driving subsequently causing the 
vehicle to roll several times (R. 316: 42); Wright was so shaken up by this tragedy that he 
basically did nothing but sit on the couch by himself for a whole year and did not talk 
with anyone (R. 316: 42-43); Wright suffered from physical and emotional abuse from an 
alcoholic and drug abusing father (R. 316: 45-46); Wright lived in great fear during his 
childhood due to his father's addictions and was repeatedly left alone with his sister while 
his father was out drinking at night (R. 316: 45); and Wright had been sexually abused as 
a child (R. 316: 51-54). Wright never received any counseling to help him cope with 
losing his mother, to help him adjust to the physical and emotional abuse from his father, 
or to help him cope with the sexual abuse (R. 316: 44). His trial counsel also failed to 
adequately inform the judge of Wright's limited role in the crime he plead guilty to, and 
failed to correct the judge's misunderstanding that children lived at the residence where 
methamphetamine was being manufactured (R. 175: 22; 316: 7). 
The State claims that these facts are more similar to Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E.2d 
801 (Va. 2003), than to Wiggins ox Armstrong (Br. of App. at 28). However, Lovitt is 
inapposite. Lovitt claimed that his trial counsel failed to investigate into his background 
and family history. 585 S.E.2d at 820. The Virginia Court distinguished Wiggins, finding 
that Lovitt's trial counsel presented "recent personal history as mitigation evidence" 
which was "provided by four sheriffs deputies working at the Arlington jail," which 
showed that he participated in Bible study, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and 
voluntary work programs. Id. at 823. Trial counsel also presented family history 
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evidence through his stepsister. Id. The stepsister testified that Lovitt helped take care of 
his brothers and sisters "because his stepfather was an alcoholic and 'wasn't allowed 
around us most of the time.'" Id. At the habeas hearing, further testimony was given 
stating that Lovitt was beaten by his stepfather. The stepfather also abuse alcohol and 
drugs and allegedly molested Lovitt and the other children. Id. at 824. 
However, the Virginia Court noted that Lovitt had a long history of drug abuse, 
including the use of heroin, amphetamines, acid, and phencyclidine. 585 S.E.2d at 824. 
The record also showed that Lovitt had a "serious problem with anger." Id. Juvenile 
records further provided that his childhood home was "very clean and nicely furnished," 
and that he was provided a "stable home life" by his mother and stepfather. Id. These 
records also described Lovitt as "physically aggressive" and "manipulative," and as 
having assaulted other juveniles as a detention center. Id. Lovitt's criminal record also 
contained numerous felonies "including attempted robbery, several burglaries and 
larcenies, and drug violations." Id. at 825. In fact, he was on parole at the time he 
murdered the victim in this case. Id. 
The Court held that the evidence concerning Lovitt's "extensive drug abuse and 
antisocial personality disorder" showed he was a "career criminal" that would be 
unaffected by further attempts of rehabilitative services. 585 S.E.2d at 825. The Court 
concluded that, based on all the evidence before it, Lovitt was not prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's failure to further investigate and present the available mitigation evidence. Id. 
Wright asserts that the facts in the present case are distinguishable from Lovitt. 
Lovitt's trial counsel presented numerous witnesses at the sentencing hearing that 
5 
testified in behalf of Lovitt. 585 S.E.2d at 823. However, in this case, no witnesses 
testified on Wright's behalf even though numerous people were available and willing to 
testify in his behalf (R. 315: 20, 33). Moreover, in Lovitt, there was little mitigating 
evidence to present - it mostly concerned the fact that his stepfather beat him. Id. at 824, 
The vast majority of the evidence showed that Lovitt was a career criminal with a violent 
history and that rehabilitation would not work. Id. at 825. 
Wright's criminal record is not comparable to the defendant in Lovitt. Wright has 
no history of violence, besides one domestic dispute occurring in 1994 (R. 173: 6). 
Moreover, Wright's record consists mainly of juvenile offenses: a couple of shoplifting 
charges, two marijuana possession charges, and a few fish/game violations (R. 173: 5). 
His adult record shows that he did not have a drug charge for over ten years (R. 173: 6). 
Wright asserts that if the sentencing judge heard all of the mitigating evidence concerning 
his life history and his involvement in this crime, he would have received a more 
favorable sentence. 
II. JUDGE BRIAN'S TESTIMONY AT THE RULE 23B HEARING IS 
RELEVANT TO THIS ISSUE 
The State argues that Judge Brian's testimony at the rule 23B hearing is irrelevant 
and not helpful (Br. of App. at 33-34). While Judge Brian's testimony regarding whether 
or not the mitigating evidence would have changed Wright's sentence is not dispositive. 
Wright asserts that it certainly is relevant in determining whether he would have received 
a more favorable outcome at the sentencing hearing. 
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The State claims that Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 
1337 (1949), and United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971) are not relevant 
(Br. of App. at 35). However, these cases outline that fundamental fairness requires "a 
sentencing judge to act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising 
discretion in fixing a sentence." Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. When imposing a sentence, a 
judge is required "to consider all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances 
involved in the crime.5' Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585, 79 S.Ct. 421, 427, 3 
L.Ed.2d 516 (1959). Likewise, a "sentencing judge must have 'the fullest information 
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics,' so that the punishment fits 
not only the crime, but the defendant as well." United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 
1038 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 247)). Moreover, "A 
trial court which fashions an inflexible practice in sentencing contradicts the judicially 
approved policy in favor of individualizing sentences." Daniels, 446 F.2d at 971. 
The record shows that Judge Brian adopted an inflexible sentencing practice when 
he emphatically proclaimed, "it is my hope that this morning, the word goes out, if you 
cook in this town and you come to my court you're going to prison" (R. 175: 24). 
Although the State claims that Judge Brian "never expressed the view that defendant 
himself was the actual methamphetamine cook or that he was personally involved in 
selling drugs" (Br. of App. at 31), Judge Brian asserted at the rule 23B hearing that 
Wright "was an active participant cooking methamphetamine with children in the home 
in a neighborhood where people lived close by and he put the stuff in circulation for 
people to buy and ruin their lives with" (R. 316: 7). 
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And although Judge Brian attempted to retract his statement and explain that not 
everyone that "cooks" will go to prison, he stated that he believed Wright deserved "more 
than 15 years" in the "state penitentiary for that crime" (R. 316: 34). However, the 
evidence shows that Wright was not a participant in cooking the methamphetamine, 
although he did know it was taking place (R. 315: 44; 316: 26-27). Despite the feet that 
Judge Brian heard evidence at the rule 23B hearing explaining Wright's limited 
participation in this crime, evidence explaining Wright's troubled childhood and how this 
affected his life, and the ample positive character evidence regarding Wright's life 
history, Judge Brian declared "this was as clear a state-penitentiary case as I've seen" (R. 
316:34). 
Wright asserts that these statements show that Judge Brian's testimony is 
undoubtedly relevant, although not dispositive of, the question of whether he would have 
received a more favorable sentence but for trial counsel's deficient performance. 
Moreover, the case law previously cited to is also on point, showing that judges are 
required to consider all the evidence, mitigating and aggravating, when imposing 
sentence. Otherwise, there would be no point to a sentencing hearing if the mitigating 
evidence had no effect on the sentence outcome. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Wright asks 
this Court to reverse the trial court's sentencing order and remand this case for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of January, 2003. 
fargaret B. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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